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As spring approaches, the Walmart.com operation in Silicon Valley receives a series of
online orders from Rolando Franco. While most of the products are to be delivered to
Franco's offices across the country in South River, New Jersey, some of the orders are to
be shipped directly to his associates in Europe. A world away in St. Petersburg, Russia, the
Baltic State Technical University places an order for some newly announced laptop
computers using the Dell Computer website. Meanwhile, back in snowy Quebec, Pierre
Boileau decides to go online and subscribe to America Online Canada, the local subsidiary
of the well-known U.S.-based Internet services provider. Pursuing any of these hypothetical
transactions-whether conducted wholly within the country, partially within the country,
or entirely abroad-could result in substantial administrative, civil, and criminal penalties
under U.S. laws and regulations. In each case, this exposure arises not because of the
nature of the business being conducted, but rather because of who is participating in the
transaction.
The late Sam Walton said the secret to Wal-Mart's success was its "ten-foot attitude."
He insisted each employee, or associate, make shopping at Wal-Mart a personal experience.
During meetings with the employees at his stores Sam would say, "I want you to promise
that whenever you come within 10 feet of a customer, you will look him in the eye, greet
him, and ask if you can help him."' It is difficult to apply this personal approach to the
*© P.L. Fitzgerald, 2001. Peter L. Fitzgerald is an Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College
of Law, St. Petersburg, Florida; B.A. William and Mary 1973;J.D. University of California-Hastings College
of Law 1976; LL.M. (European Legal Studies) University of Exeter, United Kingdom, 1981. Professor Fitz-
gerald teaches an E-Commerce Seminar, International Law, International Business Transactions, and Inter-
national Trade Regulation. Prior to joining the Stetson faculty, Professor Fitzgerald was a member of the IBM
Legal Department and law clerk to the Honorable Patrick E. Higginbotham, U.S. District Court, Northern
District of Texas.
1. Walmart.com, Sam's Way: About Walmart.com, at http://www.walmart.com/cservice/aw-samsway.gsp
(visited Dec. 12, 2000).
48 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
world of e-commerce, and Sam's associates at Walmart.com ask themselves daily how to
apply the "ten foot attitude" to a website. 2 They declare that the answer starts,
[]e figure, with striving to build a site that is easy for customers to use. We work every
day to bring you a better shopping experience. Our online store will always be a work in
progress, but one thing won't change: our commitment to keeping our customers' needs at
the top of our priority list.'
Making e-commerce sites easy to use and meeting online users' needs depends in large part
upon knowing as much as possible about who uses a particular site and what they want.
Data mining-gathering, collating, and organizing information concerning one's cus-
tomers and trading partners-is of fundamental importance to all forms of e-commerce,
whether on the business-to-business or business-to-consumer level.4 In addition to the usual
types of information exchanged during the course of any ordinary commercial transaction,
online commerce is becoming particularly dependent upon the personalization of the of-
ferings or services provided in order to distinguish one e-business from another. This is
seen, for example, in the "welcome" screens employed by Amazon.com and a number of
other sites that greet returning customers by name and highlight products or services re-
lating to their past transactions.
This drive towards increasing personalization creates substantial pressure to use whatever
technology is available to obtain more and more information from users and visitors to
e-business sites, but gathering this information also creates new exposures. While most
e-businesses are aware of the privacy issues these technologies and activities create,5 a po-
tentially more explosive, and much less appreciated, exposure lies hidden in the various
blacklists employed in the federal government's trade controls and economic sanctions
programs. These exposures are especially insidious, as they generally derive from laws and
regulations that both predate the advent of most e-commerce technology and that were
not generally crafted with e-commerce transactions in mind. Nevertheless, given the global
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Jonathan Berry, Database Marketing-A Potent New Tool for Selling, Bus. WK., Sept. 5, 1994, at
56; Laurie Hays, Using Computers to Divine Who Might Buy a Gas Grill, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1994, at B 1. The
terminology that has developed around this area can be confusing, with fine distinctions sometimes being
implied between the software and technology being employed to gather information (e.g., data mining tools),
the application of those tools to extract information or infer relationships from computerized records that are
not necessarily readily apparent (e.g., database mining), and the process of transforming that information into
business decisions (e.g., database marketing). See Kurt Thearling, From Data Mining to Database Marketing,
White Papers, at http://www3.shore.net/kht/text/wp9502/wp9502.htm (visited Dec. 12, 2000). For an over-
view of the types of tools and techniques available for data mining, see generally A. Michael Froomkin, Flood
Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & Com.
395 (1996).
5. The impact of data mining upon privacy has generated a vigorous debate both within the United States
and internationally. See, e.g., Edward C. Baig et al., Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal Info. What's in It
for You?, Bus. WK., Apr. 5, 1999, at 84; Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the DigitalAge: A Work
in Progress, 23 NovA L. REV. 549 (1999); Deirdre Mulligan, Center for Democracy & Technology, Public
Workshop on Online Profiling: Testimony of the Center for Democracy and Technology Before the Federal Trade Com-
mission (Nov. 30, 1999), at http://www.cdt.org/testimony/ftc/991130mulligan.shtml (visited Dec. 12, 2000);
Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315
(2000).
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reach of online operations, these laws and regulations do apply to e-commerce transactions
and violations can result in potentially disastrous consequences.
Consider, for example, Walmart.com's hypothetical dealings with Rolando Franco.
Franco was named6 to the U.S. Commerce Department's Denied Persons List (DPL)7
because he violated' the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)9 promulgated under the
Export Administration Act (EAA).' ° The State Department maintains a similar blacklist of
those who violate the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)," promulgated
under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 2 which is known as the Debarred List. 3 If
Walmart.com conducts business with parties named on these blacklists, like Franco, it risks
violating the U.S. trade control regulations itself,4 even without being direcdy involved in
an export."
If Dell Computer knowingly sends its products to the Baltic State Technical University,
it, too, risks violating the U.S. export controls." The University appears on a blacklist of
foreign entities of concern with regard to their involvement in weapons proliferation ac-
6. See 60 Fed. Reg. 29,550 (June 5, 1995); 57 Fed. Reg. 33,936 (July 31, 1992).
7. 15 C.F.R. pt. 764, Supp. 2 (2000). The DPL is also available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/2-
denial.htm. See also infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
8. In 1992, Rolando Franco was found guilty of violating U.S. export control laws for attempting to divert
U.S. computer components to the Soviet Union. He received a two year suspended jail sentence, three years
probation, and a $6,000 fine. Franco's export privileges were also denied for five years. However, in 1994,
Franco was again arrested and found guilty of violating the terms of the 1992 denial order by making numerous
overseas shipments. He was fined $3,000 and served five months imprisonment that was followed by three
years supervised release. In addition, his export privileges were denied for an additional ten years. See Bureau
of Export Administration, Tip from an Alert Manufacturer Helps Commerce Export Enforcement Uncover Violation
by a Denied Party, at http://www.bxa/doc.gov/Enforcement/CaseSummaries/franco.htm (visited Dec. 12,2000);
New Jersey Man Sentenced for Violating Export Denial Terms, EXPORT CONTROL NEws, Dec. 30, 1994, available
at LEXIS, Nexis News Library, News Group File.
9. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-74 (2000).
10. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1994). The EAA, by its own terms, must be renewed periodically. The EAA
expired in 1994, and the EAR promulgated under the EAA was administered under temporary extensions
pursuant to the president's authority under the IEEPA for many years. See Continuation of Export Control
Regulations, Exec. Order No. 12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (Aug. 19, 1994); Exec. Order No. 12,981, 60 Fed.
Reg. 62,981 (Dec. 5, 1995); Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg.
42,527 (Aug. 14, 1996); Amendment to Executive Order No. 12,981, Exec. Order No. 13,020, 61 Fed. Reg.
54,079 (Oct. 12, 1996); Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg.
43,629 (Aug. 13, 1997); Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg.
44,121 (Aug. 13, 1998); Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg.
44,101 (Aug. 10, 1996); and Continuation of Emergency Regarding Export Control Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg.
48,347 (Aug. 3, 2000). On November 13, 2000 President Clinton signed H.R. 5239, the Export Administration
Modification and Clarification Act of 2000, which reinstated and extended the EAA until August 20, 2001. See
Statement by the President (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/press/2000/HR%205239.html
(visited Dec. 12, 2000); Congress Passes "Baby" EAA, EXPORT PRACTITIONER, Nov. 2000, at 11.
It. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-28 (2000).
12. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2778-99 (1994).
13. Announcement of actions with regard to debarred parties periodically appear in the Federal Register.
Additionally, an unofficial version of the debarred list is available online at http://www.pmdtc.org/
debar059.htm.
14. See General Prohibition Four (Denial Orders)-Engaging in Actions Prohibited by a Denial Order, 15
C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(4) (2000).
15. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
16. See General Prohibition Five-Export or Reexport to Prohibited End-Uses or End-Users (End-Use
End-User), IS C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(5) (2000).
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tivities. 17 Unlike the debarred or denied persons blacklists, the parties designated on the
Commerce Department's Entities List" need not have violated U.S. law themselves-rather
they tend to be parties engaged in behavior that is frowned upon by the government but
who are beyond the direct reach of U.S. law and jurisdiction. Those who are subject to
U.S. jurisdiction, such as Dell Computer, are prohibited from dealing with these blacklisted
entities without U.S. government approval."
A willful failure to comply with these trade controls may be punished by criminal penalties
of up to ten years imprisonment, and organizational fines of up to $1 million or five times
the value of the goods, whichever is greater.20 Criminal penalties of up to five years' im-
prisonment and fines of up to $50,000 or five times the value of the goods are available for
knowing violations.' Civil fines of up to $100,000 may also be imposed without any show-
ing of knowledge or intent to violate the controls.2
The scenario involving Pierre Boileau, unlike the previous two examples, does not involve
trade with the United States at all. If American Online Canada conducts business with
Pierre Boileau, even though that business is conducted in Canada and between Canadian
parties, it nevertheless violates the Treasury Department's regulations regarding the Cuban
embargo23 promulgated under the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA).2 4 The U.S.
government considers Pierre Boileau, a Canadian, as a specially designated national (SDN)
17. Additions to Entity List: Russian Entities, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,363 (July 29,1998).
18. Entity List, 15 C.F.R. pt. 744, Supp. No. 4 (2000), available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Entities/
Default.htm (visited Dec. 12, 2000).
19. BXA explains that:
Since February 1997, the Federal Register has published several Commerce Department rules which
added entities to the Entity List, a listing of foreign endusers involved in proliferation activities....
These end-users have been determined to present an unacceptable risk of diversion to developing
weapons of mass destruction or missles used to deliver those weapons. Publishing this list puts exporters
on notice that any products sold to these end-users may present concerns and will require a license
from the Bureau of Export Administration... Interagency groups involved in the export control process
reviewed the activities of the published entities of concern and determined that exports to these entities
would create an unacceptable risk of use in or diversion to prohibited proliferation-related activities.
Publishing this entities list allows the U.S. government to identify for U.S. businesses some of the
organizations and companies that may be involved in proliferation activities. The development of a list
of entities of concern arises from the ... initiative begun in 1990 to stem the spread of missile tech-
nology as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Under [this initiative] the Commerce
Department can impose licensing requirements on exports and reexports of normally uncontrolled
goods and technology where there is an unacceptable risk of use in or diversion to activities related to
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or missile proliferation, even if the end-user is not primarily
weapons-related.
Bureau of Export Administration, The Entity List: Background, at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Entities/Default.htm
(visited Dec. 12, 2000) (emphasis added).
20. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(b)(2) (2000). The maximum criminal fine for an individual
is $250,000. See also 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1994); 22 C.F.R. § 127.3 (2000).
21. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(a) (1994); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(b)(1) (2000).
22. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c) (1994); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(a)(1) (2000). If national security controls are not at
issue, the maximum civil fine is $10,000. Civil liability may be imposed without any showing of intent or
knowledge. See Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e) (1994); 22
C.F.R. § 127.10 (2000) (increases the maximum civil fine to $500,000 if munition items are involved).
23. 31 C.F.R. § 515 (2000).
24. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1994).
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of Cuba." Dealings with a SDN, whether in the United States or in a foreign country, are
treated the same as direct dealings with the targets of the government's various economic
sanctions programs.16 Thus, the United States considers any transactions with Pierre Bo-
ileau in Canada as if they were direct dealings with Cuba, triggering the broad prohibitions
associated with that embargo program.27 Moreover, because of the extraterritorial reach of
the regulations, America Online's Canadian subsidiary is as obligated to comply with the
terms of the embargo as is its Virginia-based parent company, at least from the perspective
of U.S. law.28 Violations of TWEA-based economic sanctions, like those imposed on Cuba,
are punishable by imprisonment for up to ten years, and organizational criminal fines of
up to $1 million, civil fines up to $55,000, and forfeiture of any property or funds involved
in the transaction. 9 Violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), which provides the foundation for many of the newer economic sanctions pro-
grams, 30 are similarly punishable by imprisonment for up to ten years, criminal fines of up
to $50,000, and civil fines of up to $11,000.11
25. List of Specially Designated Nations, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,459 (Dec. 10, 1986). Pierre Bolieau was added to
the SDN blacklist associated with the Cuban embargo on January 7, 1981, along with two other individuals, a
Jamaican firm, six Panamanian firms, and two U.S. companies, all of whom allegedly were involved in evading
the terms of the U.S. embargo of Cuba with their operations in third countries. See REUTER N. AM. NEws,
Feb. 11, 1981, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUNA File. Interestingly, Bolieau's name-and the names
of the other parties on the Cuban SDN blacklist-did not actually appear in the Federal Register until this
publication in 1986. There are numerous similar due process problems associated with the Treasury Depart-
ment's administration of its economic sanctions programs. See Peter L. Fitzgerald, If Property Rights Were
Treated Like Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away with This: Blacklisting and Due Process in U.S. Economic
Sanctions Programs, 51 HAsT NGs L.J. 73 (1999).
26. The Cuban Asset Control Regulations (CACR) prohibit all dealings with Cuba or Cuban nationals,
without any geographic limitation. The broad basic regulatory prohibition states:
All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of
the Treasury . . . by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise if ... such
transactions are by, or on behalf of, or pursuant to the direction of [Cuba] or any national thereof, or
such transactions involve property in which [Cuba] or any national thereof has.., had any interest of
any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect....
31 C.F.R. § 515.201(a) (2000). The CACR then defines "national" to include not only Cuban citizens and
business entities, but also any foreign entities that are directly or indirectly owned or controlled by Cuba or
Cuban nationals; those who are believed to "act directly or indirectly for the benefit or on behalf of" Cuba or
Cuban nationals; and those whom the Secretary of the Treasury deems to be a Cuban national. 31 C.F.R.
§§ 515.305, 515.306 (2000). Thus, through the Secretary's power to name SDNs, the basic regulatory prohi-
bition of the CACR may be extended to third parties who are not otherwise identified with Cuba or Cuban
citizenship. See also American Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 867 n.2 (U.S. App. D.C. 1984).
27. The CACR impose a sweeping set of prohibitions affecting all transfers of credit; transactions in foreign
exchange; bullion, currency, or securities; "transfers, withdrawals, or exportations of, any property or evidences
of indebtedness or evidences of ownership of property;" "all transfers outside the United States with regard to
any property or property interest subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;" and specifically including
the "purchase, transport, import, or [other dealing] with respect to any [Cuban] merchandise." 31 C.F.R.
§§ 515.201, 515.204 (2000); see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.203 (voids all prohibited transactions).
28. Canada takes a decidedly different view of the legitimacy of the extraterritorial application of U.S. law
to Canadian nationals and companies. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
29. 50 U.S.C. app. § 16 (1994); 31 C.F.R. § 515.701 (2000). The maximum criminal fine for an individual
is $250,000 or twice the pecuniary gain from the transaction, whichever is greater. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1994);
31 C.F.R. § 515.701(b).
30. Unlike the government's trade controls, where all types of goods and services are regulated within a
single set of regulations, the Treasury Department typically issues entirely separate, stand-alone regulations
for each of its various sanctions programs and embargoes. See infra notes 69-97 and accompanying text.
31. 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (1994). IEEPA also provides the legislative foundation for the EAR during periods
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Each of these potential violations occurs because a transaction is being conducted with
a party that is blacklisted by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration
(BXA), the State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC), or the Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC). Violating the regulatory limita-
tions on dealing with blacklisted parties can lead to substantial fines or criminal penalties.32
However, the administrative sanctions available to these agencies to enforce their controls
are much more commercially significant than any civil or criminal penalty. Simply put,
those who engage in impermissible dealings with blacklisted parties may, in turn, find them-
selves blacklisted. 3" Walmart.com, Dell Computer, America Online, or any other business,
could suddenly find their activities effectively curtailed or shut down as a result of dealing
with the wrong customer or trading partner.34 Under the letter of the law, even inadvertent
violations of these laws and regulations can actually substantially restrict or stop business
altogether."
A. GOVERNMENTAL BLACKLISTS IN U.S. TRADE CONTROL PROGRAMS 36
BXA and DTC, as the U.S. government's principal trade control agencies, 37 traditionally
used blacklisting as a secondary tool to enforce their primary regulatory controls on ex-
porting goods, services, and technology from the United States. Broad, product-oriented
regulations aimed at controlling transactions based upon the technical capabilities of the
specific products or technologies being exported, or disclosed to foreign nationals within
the country, are at the heart of EAR and ITAR. The precise controls applied to specific
items in any given transaction are detailed in complex regulatory control lists promulgated
by each agency."R Almost any item or service that moves internationally will be covered by
when the EAA has lapsed. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Accordingly, EAR specifically provides
that penalties shall be appropriately limited to whatever authority is in effect at the time a violation occurs. See
15 C.F.R. § 764.3 (2000).
32. See supra notes 20-22, 29-31 and accompanying text.
33. See 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(a) (2000); 22 C.F.R. §§ 127.7-.8 (2000); see also, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.302(a)(3),
515.305, 515.306(a)(2) (2000).
34. Seesupra notes 6-10, 16-19, 24-28 and accompanying text; infra notes 47, 50-52, 64-65, 116, 143-45 and
accompanying text.
35. See infra note 152-56 and accompanying text; see also Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
36. See generally Peter L. Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy,
31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 28-35 (1998).
37. There is no single agency or department responsible for U.S. trade controls. On the contrary, there are
a variety of agencies involved in regulating U.S. exports and foreign trade, usually depending upon the goods
or technology being transferred. These include the Department of Agriculture (tobacco seeds and plants), the
Drug Enforcement Agency (narcotics and dangerous drugs), the Department of Energy (natural gas, nuclear,
and electric power), the Food and Drug Administration (drugs, biologics, and medical devices), the Department
of the Interior (endangered fish and wildlife, migratory birds, and Bald and Golden Eagles), the Maritime
Administration (large watercraft), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (nuclear equipment and material), and
the Patent Office (technology contained in patent filings). See Other U.S. Government Departments and
Agencies with Export Control Responsibilities, 15 C.F.R. pt. 730, Supp. 3 (2000). The vast majority of export
and trade related matters, however, are the responsibility of the Departments of Commerce and State.
38. DTC controls products, services, and technology, described in the United States Munitions List, 22
C.F.R. § 121 (2000), and BXA controls products, services, and technology described in the Commerce Control
List, 15 C.F.R. pt. 774, Supp. 1 (2000).
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one or the other of these control lists.39 Despite the substantial criminal and civil penalties
available to punish those who fail to comply with these trade controls, 40 it is the agencies'
ability to administratively blacklist violators that has the greatest commercial significance
and impact. Blacklisted parties lose the right to export or receive U.S. goods or technology
either directly from the United States or from others elsewhere who are subject to U.S.
extraterritorial jurisdiction.41
The Commerce Department calls its blacklist the DPL42 because persons or organiza-
tions listed in the DPL have been denied43 the ability to make or receive exports of goods
or technology subject to U.S. jurisdiction.4 Denial Orders are issued by the Under Sec-
retary for Export Administration following proceedings before an administrative law
judge.45 Temporary Denial Orders may also be issued if BXA believes that a violation of its
regulations is imminent.4 6 Denial is typically employed, however, as a sanction after a vio-
lation has occurred47 There are currently 304 entries on the DPL, many of which list
multiple names or locations41 Thirty-four of these entries pertain to parties in the United
States, including Rolando Franco.
4 9
39. See P.L. Fitzgerald, Prevention of Liability for Export Control Violations, in BNA/ACCA CORPORATE COM-
PLIANCE MANUAL, Ch.14, § B(2)(b)(2) (1998).
40. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
41. See Standard Terms of Orders Denying Export Privileges, 15 C.F.R. pt. 764, Supp. 1 (2000); 15 C.F.R.
§§ 766.24-.25 (2000).
42. 15 C.F.R. pt. 764, Supp. 2 (2000), available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/DPL/denialist.html (visited Dec.
12, 2000). The names of parties being added to the list appear periodically in the Federal Register. This list
used to be referred to as the Table of Denial Orders (TDO) but this terminology caused confusion with the
term "Temporary Denial Order" used in connection with certain ex parte and other proceedings where export
privileges are denied for a renewable six month period. See id. § 766.24; see also infra note 46.
43. There is a great deal of discretion in determining precisely what privileges will be lost, and for how long.
Denial periods ranging up to thirty-five years have been issued. See Actions Affecting Export Privileges: Globe
Computers et al. of Goran Josberg, 54 Fed. Reg. 9,537 (Mar. 7, 1989); Order Vacating Temporary Denial
Order, Goran Josberg, 54 Fed. Reg. 13,715 (Apr. 5, 1989). It was not uncommon to see denial orders of
indefinite (i.e., virtually permanent) duration in the 1980s. See also Denied Persons List, 15 C.F.R. pt. 764,
Supp. 2 (2000), available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/DPL/Default.htm.
44. No one subject to U.S. jurisdiction may engage in an export-related transaction that directly or indirectly
benefits a denied party. See 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(a)(2) (2000). This includes "ordering, buying, receiving, using,
selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing... any
transaction ... that is subject to the EAR." Id.; see Standard Terms of Orders Denying Export Privileges, 15
C.F.R. pt. 764, Supp. 1 (2000) at (b)B.
45. See Administrative Enforcement Proceedings, 15 C.F.R §§ 766.1-.25 (2000).
46. See Temporary Denials, 15 C.F.R. § 766.24 (2000). Export privileges may be suspended, in ex parte
proceedings, with only a suspicion that a violation has or will occur. See, e.g., Action Affecting Export Privileges:
Delft Instruments N.V., 56 Fed. Reg. 8,321-02 (Feb. 28, 1991). These temporary denial orders may not exceed
180 days in duration, but may be renewed indefinitely.
47. The violation that triggers the denial order does not necessarily have to be a violation of the EAA. BXA
has the ability to issue a denial order for violations of any trade-related regulation or a statute such as AECA
or IEEPA. Thus, a Commerce denial order could be issued as a collateral sanction for an ITAR violation, for
example. See 15 C.F.R. § 766.25 (2000). Convictions in the United States or abroad can support this type of
denial, and the parties may be collaterally estopped from challenging the facts in any subsequent proceedings.
See, e.g., Spawr Optical Research, Inc. v. Baldrige, 649 F. Supp. 1366 (D.D.C. 1986); Action Affecting Export
Privileges: Japan Aviation Electronics Industry, 57 Fed. Reg. 9,533-03 (Mar. 19, 1992); In re Export Privileges;
Ahlberg, 55 Fed. Reg. 8,504 (Mar. 8, 1990). This type of denial order may not exceed ten years in duration.
48. See Bureau of Export Administration, The List of Denied Persons, at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpll2-
denial.htm (visited Oct. 22, 2000).
49. See id.
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If Walmart.com contracts to deliver goods to Franco's associates in Europe, it is engaged
in an export-related transaction with a denied party. Walmart.com accordingly risks having
its own export privileges denied. If that were to occur, Walmart.com would lose its ability
to "order, buy, sell, use, receive, deliver, store, dispose of, service, transport finance, or
forward" U.S.-origin goods or technology in any export-related transaction." The pro-
posed deliveries to Franco's New Jersey offices would appear to be entirely domestic, out-
side the ambit of the government's export controls, and therefore free from this risk. How-
ever, if Walmart.com has any "reason to know" the goods are not going to remain in the
United States, it might still be sanctioned for acting with knowledge of a violation because
Franco-as a blacklisted party-is known to be precluded from involvement in any legiti-
mate export-related transactions.5' Thus, these export-related controls can also impact what
might otherwise be considered as domestic business dealings. It also highlights that, given
the global nature of e-commerce, almost any transaction has the potential to be export-
related and subject to the Commerce Department's regulatory controls. 2
The process at the State Department for imposing administrative sanctions under ITAR
has a similar effect, but is handled slightly differently and results in debarring persons or
organizations from exporting or receiving goods or technology regulated by ITAR11 The
Director of DTC may order parties debarred following administrative hearings54 or upon
conviction of violating any of the trade-related laws," including the EAA, IEEPA, and
TWEA.16 When it is "reasonably necessary to protect world peace or the security or foreign
policy of the United States," the DTC also has the ability to temporarily suspend ITAR
privileges.57 Debarment remains, however, like the Commerce denial order, primarily a
50. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
51. 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(e) (2000), which states:
No person may order, buy, remove, conceal, store, use, sell, loan, dispose of, transfer, transport, finance,
forward, or otherwise service, in whole or in part, any item exported or to be exported from the United
States, or that is otherwise subject to the EAR, with knowledge that a violation of the EEA, the EAR,
or any order, license, or authorization issued thereunder, has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended
to occur in connection with the item.
See also Causing aiding or abetting a violation, 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(b); Coverage of more than exports § 730.5
(2000).
52. If an impermissible export-related transaction occurs, with a denied party like Rolando Franco for ex-
ample, the question would then be whether the e-business was in a position to demonstrate a negative prop-
osition to government investigators-that it did not have "reason to know" it was involved in an export-related
transaction-in order to avoid liability under 15 C.F.R. § 764.2(e) (2000). See also infra note 157 and accom-
panying text (addressing the notion of "deemed exports").
53. DTC's debarment authority is embodied in 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (2000). The typical duration for a de-
barment is three years. See id. § 127.7(a).
54. This is referred to as administrative debarment. See id. §§ 127.7(b)(2), 128.10. Administrative debarment
orders are effective until rescinded.
55. This is referred to as statutory debarment. See id. § 127.7(c). It is roughly analogous to Commerce's
collateral sanction provision. 15 C.F.R. § 766.25 (2000); see supra note 48. The standard duration for a statutory
debarment is three years, but exporting privileges are not automatically reinstated. The statutorily debarred
party may be required to apply for reinstatement. See 22 C.F.R. § 127.10(b)(2) (2000).
56. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.27, 127.7 (2000).
57. Id. § 127.8. This interim suspension cannot exceed sixty days unless other proceedings are instituted.
See id. § 127.8(a).
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sanction for violating the regulatory requirements of the State Department's trade con-
trols.5 8 Ninety-nine parties are currently blacklisted on the Debarred List.5 9
The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), announced by President Bush in
1990, greatly expanded the role of blacklisting in U.S. trade controls and also marked a
fundamental shift in focus of the traditional export control system.60 Export licensing con-
trols on specific products were de-emphasized in favor of a much greater focus on con-
trolling the behavior of parties subject to U.S. jurisdiction and their dealings with their
customers and trading partners. The EPCI nonproliferation initiative added new obliga-
tions to the product-oriented trade control system that focus upon what exporters and
vendors "know" about the parties with whom they are dealing, and what these parties will
do with the products they acquire. 61 The EPCI regulations make the export of virtually any
item a licensable transaction, if it involves a "bad" customer or a "bad" end-use by an
otherwise acceptable customer.62 Since presumably exporters will know more about what
will be done with the goods and services they sell than any licensing official could ever
know, the government effectively shifted the decision about what was a permissible or
impermissible transaction on to the exporters themselves. Thus, it is the exporters' knowl-
edge of their customer and their customers' activities that triggers EPCI licensing controls,
not the government's decision to place an item on the control list.
The government created a new form of blacklisting to augment these EPCI nonprolif-
eration controls on transactions with suspect end-uses or end-users. By naming a party like
the Baltic State Technical University to the Entities List, the government affirmatively
conveys the knowledge that the blacklisted individual or organization is involved in the
weapons proliferation activities required to trigger the controls.63 Accordingly, shipping
Dell Computers to the blacklisted University requires a government license approval, even
if exporting the same computers to some other customer would not.64 If the necessary
approval is not obtained in advance, Dell risks being administratively added to the DPL
58. It should be noted that the same term, "debarment," is also used to refer to companies who have lost
their contracting rights with the federal government. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.400 (2000). This in and of itself is
grounds for being debarred by DTC. See 22 C.F.R. § 126.7(a)(5) (2000).
59. Office of Defense Trade Controls, List of Debarred Parties, at http://www.pmdtc.org/debarO59.htm(vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2000).
60. See Exec. Order No. 12,735, 55 Fed. Reg. 48,587 (Nov. 16, 1990).
61. EPCI also imposed a series of product-specific controls on the actual weapons of mass destruction. See,
for example, the Commerce controls on chemical precursors that are useful in constructing chemical weapons,
15 C.F.R. § 742.2(a)(2) (2000); Biological agents and viroids, id. § 742.2(a)(1); chemical/biological weapons
production equipment, id. § 742.2(a)(3); missile related equipment and technology, id. § 742.5; specified nuclear
related items, id. § 742.3; the Energy Department controls on nuclear power generation equipment, 10 C.F.R.
§ 110 (2000); and the State Department controls on actual weaponry such as toxicological agents, United States
Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2000); Category XIV, and its Missile Technology Control Regime Annex,
id. § 121.6.
62. This is neatly stated in General Prohibition Five-Export or Reexport to Prohibited End-Uses or End-Users
stating: "You may not, without a license, knowingly export or reexport any item subject to the EAR to an end
user or end use that is prohibited by part 744 of the EAR." 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(5) (2000).
63. Additionally, the government sometimes designates an entire country or area as presenting a high risk
for proliferation-related activities, rather than identifying particular persons or organizations, therebytriggering
the controls on a large scale. See, for example, the destinations of concern for the Missile Technology Control
Regime for country group D:4, 15 C.F.R. § 740 supp. 1 (2000), the destinations of concern for chemical and
biological weapons proliferation for country group D:3, id., and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Special Country
List for country group D:2, id. While significant from a trade control perspective, this type of designation is
not the sort of particularized blacklisting with which this article is concerned.
64. See id. §§ 736.2(b)(4)-(5), 744.1(c).
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for its violation--denying Dell access to U.S. goods and technology for any export-related
transactions-with disastrous consequences to its business.65
In contrast to those listed on the Debarred List or the DPL, however, parties named on
the Entities List may not have engaged in any illegal conduct themselves. To the contrary,
the activities that cause the U.S. government concern might well be entirely legal where
they are performed and even actively encouraged by the local governments. These individ-
uals and organizations are not sanctioned for violating U.S. regulations they are blacklisted
solely because their activities are contrary to the U.S. government's policies regarding the
potential spread of technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction.66 There are
currently 118 major entries on the Entities List, along with several hundred related com-
panies or parties. 67
This use of blacklisting under the EPCI reflects the U.S. government's desire to extend
the reach of its trade controls to influence or coerce behavior of those beyond the direct
reach of its jurisdiction. Accordingly, blacklisting by the government's trade control agen-
cies has progressed from simply being one of several tools used to ensure compliance with
their traditional requirements and punish those who violate their rules, to being a significant
part of entirely new controls being formulated by policy makers to address new concerns.
In doing so the BXA actually imported some of the techniques developed by OFAC in its
financial and economic sanctions programs into the traditionally commodity-oriented
world of trade controls.
B. GOVERNMENTAL BLACKLISTS IN U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS PROGRAMS
6 s
Since the end of World War II, the United States has imposed economic sanctions under
the authority of the TWEA69 targeted at China (1950-1971),70 North Korea (1950-
present),"1 Cuba (1963-present)," North Vietnam (1964-1994), 7" South Vietnam (1975-
65. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
66. See Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 33-35.
67. 15 C.F.R. pt. 744, Supp. No. 4 (2000); see also Bureau of Export Administration, The Entity List, at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Entities/Default.htm (visited Dec. 12, 2000).
68. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 90-98.
69. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1994).
70. See Foreign Asset Control Regulations, 15 Fed. Reg. 9,040 (Dec. 19, 1950). The embargo was effectively
lifted in 1971 in connection with President Nixon's visit to China, although residual controls remained in place
until outstanding claims were settled in 1980. See Relaxation of Controls, 36 Fed. Reg. 8,584 (Mar. 7, 1971);
Relaxation of Controls, 36 Fed. Reg. 11,441 (June 12, 1971); Unblocking of Assets, 45 Fed. Reg. 7,224, (Jan.
31, 1980). See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: SUPPLEMENTAL
CASE HISTORIES, 100-09 (2d ed. 1990).
71. See Foreign Asset Control Regulations, 15 Fed. Reg. 9,040 (Dec. 19, 1950); 31 C.F.R. § 500 (2000). See
generally HUFBAUER, supra note 70, at 110-14. On September 17, 1999, the president announced that the
sanctions on North Korea would be loosened in the near future. See Office of Foreign Assets Controls, What's
New, Appendix A, at http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/tl ledit.txt (visited Sept. 20, 1999). On June 19, 2000, 31
C.F.R. §§ 500.533 and 500.586 were amended to relinquish OFAC's control over exports to North Korea and
to authorize certain limited transaction in accordance with President Clinton's September 17, 1999, announce-
ment. See 65 Fed. Reg. 38,165 (June 19, 2000).
72. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (2000). A variety of controls were applied to Cuba
beginning in 1960 as a result of the nationalization and expropriation of various properties. Initially, these took
the form of restrictions on various exports to and imports from Cuba. The full embargo was imposed following
the Cuban missile crisis. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 28 Fed. Reg. 6,974 (July 9, 1963). See generally
HUFBAUER, supra note 70, at 194-204.
73. See OFAC Statement of Organization, 29 Fed. Reg. 6,025 (May 5, 1964). The Vietnamese embargo was
prospectively lifted in 1994 by Prospective Lifting of Vietnam Embargo, 59 Fed. Reg. 5,696 (Feb. 7, 1994),
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1994), 74 and Cambodia (1975-1992). 71 More recently, the IEEPA76 has provided the prim-
ary legislative basis" for economic sanctions directed against Iran (1979-present),"
South Africa (1985-1991), 79 Namibia (1985-1990),80 Nicaragua (1985-1990),8l Libya
and completely removed upon settlement of outstanding claims the following year by Unblocking of Vietnam-
ese Assets, 60 Fed. Reg. 12,885 (Mar. 9, 1995). See generally HUFBAUER, supra note 70, at 133-41.
74. See supra note 73. The embargo of North Vietnam was extended to the entire country with the fall of
South Vietnam in 1975. See Blocking Extended to South Vietnam, 40 Fed. Reg. 19,202 (May 2, 1975).
75. See Blocking Controls on Cambodia, 40 Fed. Reg. 17,262 (Apr. 18, 1975). The embargo of Cambodia
was prospectively lifted in 1992 by 57 Fed. Reg. 1,872-01 (Jan. 16, 1992), and completely removed in 1994 by
Unblocking of Cambodian Assets, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,558 (Nov. 25, 1994). See generally HUFBAUER, supra note 70,
at 412-16.
76. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994).
77. Other statutes have also supported the imposition of economic sanctions. For example, the United
Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287c (1994), mandates the imposition of sanctions in accordance
with decisions of the Security Council under article 41 of the U.N. Charter. This was used to impose financial
and trade restrictions on Rhodesia when Ian Smith's white-minority government unilaterally declared its in-
dependence from the United Kingdom in 1965 thereby thwarting steps towards self-determination in Southern
Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Sanctions, 31 C.F.R. § 530 (1972), were prospectively lifted upon the accession of
majority rule and the creation of Zimbabwe in 1979 by Exec. Order No. 12,183, 44 Fed. Reg. 74,787 (Dec.
16, 1979), and entirely removed in 1992 by 57 Fed. Reg. 1,386 (Jan. 14, 1992). See generally HUFAUER, Supra
note 70, at 285-93. Since the time of the Rhodesian sanctions, the more common practice has been to predicate
the imposition of sanctions on multiple pieces of legislation. For example, both IEEPA and the UN Partici-
pation Act were used for the programs aimed at Iraq and Kuwait. See infra notes 84-85; Haiti, infra note 86;
the former Yugoslavia, infra note 87; and Angola, infra note 88. IEEPA and the International Security Devel-
opment and Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9 (1994), together support the sanctions on Libya,
see infra note 82, and the second round of sanctions aimed at Iran, see infra note 78; and the Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 bolstered the IEEPA based sanctions on South Africa, infra note 79. The sanctions
programs targeted at the Terrorism List Governments, infra note 94, and Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
infra note 95, are predicated solely upon the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, rather
than jointly with IEEPA. The only IEEPA-based terrorist sanctions are those aimed at organizations threat-
ening the Middle East peace process. See infra note 93.
78. See Iranian Assets Control Regulations (IACR), 44 Fed. Reg. 65,956 (Nov. 15, 1979); 31 C.F.R. § 535
(2000). Most of the IACR controls were prospectively lifted in 1981. See Exec. Order No. 12,283,46 Fed. Reg.
7,927 (Jan. 18, 1981); 31 C.F.R. § 535.579 (2000). Iran is also subject to further sanctions under the Iranian
Transaction Regulations, (ITR), 31 C.F.R. § 560 (2000), which now have greater impact than the IACR. See
generally GARY CLYDE HUFIAUER ET AL., EcoNoMIC SANCTIoNs REcoNsIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY
153-62 (2d ed. 1990).
79. See Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (Sept. 9, 1985). The South African Transaction
Regulations (SATR), 31 C.F.R. § 545 (1986), were initially imposed in an effort to head off more sweeping
sanctions then being proposed by Congress. The 1985 controls were substantially modified and broadened the
following year, in accordance with the Congressionally-mandated program of sanctions found in the Compre-
hensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 10 Stat. 1086 (1986). See also Exec. Order
No. 12,571, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,505 (Oct. 27, 1986); 51 Fed. Reg. 41,906 (Nov. 19, 1986); 51 Fed. Reg. 46,853
(Nov. 19, 1986). The SATR were prospectively lifted in 1991, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,056 (July 12, 1991), and the
last remaining restrictions affecting dealings in gold coins were removed in 1995. See Foreign Funds Control
Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (June 29, 1995). See generally HUFAtER, supra note 78, at 221-48.
80. Namibia, as part of South Africa, was initially caught in the sanctions that were aimed at dealings with
the government of South Africa. It was removed from the scope of the SATR in March 1990 following Na-
mibian independence. See SATR, 55 Fed. Reg. 10,618 (Mar. 22, 1990).
81. See Exec. Order No. 12,513, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (May 1, 1985). The Nicaraguan Transaction Control
Regulations (NTCR), 50 Fed. Reg. 19,890 (May 10, 1985), 31 C.F.R. § 540 (1986), were imposed as part of
the Reagan Administration's opposition to the Sandinista Government of President Daniel Ortega. They were
lifted prospectively following the election of the Chamorro Government in 1990, 55 Fed. Reg. 28,613 (July
12, 1990), and removed entirely in 1995, 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (June 29, 1995). See generally HUFBAUER, supra
note 78, at 175-91.
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(1986-present), 82 Panama (1988-1990), 8" Iraq (1990-present), 84 Kuwait (1990-1991),8s
Haiti (1991-1994), 86 the former Yugoslavia (1992-1996, 1998-present),8" Angola (1993-
82. After a series of terrorist incidents, President Reagan invoked IEEPA to impose a broad trade and
financial embargo of Libya. Additional authority for the President's actions was predicated upon the Interna-
tional Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2349aa-8,-9 (1994), which would be
used the following year to support the ITR, supra note 78, as well as the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 40,106 (1994). Two Executive Orders were issued in quick succession in January of 1986, Exec. Order No.
12,543, 51 Fed. Reg. 875 (Jan. 7, 1986) and Exec. Order No. 12,544, 51 Fed. Reg. 1235 (Jan. 8, 1986), which
provided the basis for the Libyan Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 550 (2000). Additional restrictions on
investing more than $40 million in the development of Libyan petroleum resources in any twelve-month period
were imposed with the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. See Pub. L. 104-72, 110 Stat. 541 (1996) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1701, note); HUFBAUER, supra note 78, at 140-52.
83. See Exec. Order No. 12,635, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,134 (Apr. 8, 1988). The Panamanian Transaction Regu-
lations (PTR) were imposed as part of the Reagan Administration's efforts to isolate and undermine the regime
headed by General Manuel Noriega because of involvement with drug trafficking. Panamanian Transactions
Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,566 (June 3, 1988); 31 C.F.R.§ 565 (1988). The PTR were lifted prospectively
in 1990 following the U.S. incursion that removed General Noriega from power, 55 Fed. Reg. 3,560 (Feb. 1,
1990), and removed entirely in 1995, 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725-02 (June 29, 1995). See generally HUFBAUER, supra
note 78, at 249-67.
84. When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President Bush issued two Executive Orders, one re-
stricting imports and exports to Iraq and blocking Iraqi government property, Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55
Fed. Reg. 31,803 (Aug. 2, 1990), and another blocking Kuwaiti government property as a protective measure
to limit looting by Iraq, Exec. Order 12,723, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,805 (Aug. 2, 1990). The U.S. sanctions were
brought completely into line with the related U.N. actions by Executive Order Number 12,724 with regard
to Iraq, see 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (Aug. 9, 1990), and Number 12,725 with regard to Kuwait, see 55 Fed. Reg.
33,091 (Aug. 9, 1990), thereby grounding the controls both in IEEPA and the UN Participation Act, 22 U.S.C.
§ 287c. The Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 2,112 (Jan. 18, 1991); 31 C.F.R. § 575 (2000), and the
separate but related Kuwaiti Assets Control Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 49,856 (Nov. 30, 1990); 31 C.F.R.
§ 570 (1991), utilize the full range of sanctions tools available to the government in a manner not seen since
the TWEA-based FACR and CACR. See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND U.S. TRADE § 9A.2.1
(Supp. 1996). Following the liberation of Kuwait, the KACR were prospectively lifted in 1991, 56 Fed. Reg.
12,450-01 (Mar. 26, 1991), and entirely removed in 1995 by 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725-02 (June 29, 1995). The ISR
remain in effect.
85. See supra note 84.
86. See Exec. Order No. 12,775, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,641 (Oct. 4, 1991); see also Exec. Order No. 12,779, 56
Fed. Reg. 55,975 (Oct. 28, 1991). The OFAC Haitian Transaction Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 580 (1993), which
embodied the controls created by the Executive Orders, were issued in March 1992. See 57 Fed. Reg. 10,820
(Mar. 31, 1992). When the democratically-elected President Aristide returned to Haiti, the sanctions were first
suspended, see Exec. Order No. 12,932, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,403 (Oct. 14, 1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 51,066 (Oct. 6,
1994), and then finally removed in June 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 33,725 (June 29, 1995).
87. Exec. Order No. 12,808, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,299 (May 30, 1992), was issued following the breakup of
Yugoslavia, blocking property of the governments of Serbia and Montenegro (the "Federal Republic of Yu-
goslavia" or FRY) when their troops seized territory within Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Exec. Order No.
12,810, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,347 (June 5, 1992), imposed additional controls to limit trade, and Exec. Order No.
12,831, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,253 (Jan. 15, 1993), which expanded the blocking measures to companies and FRY-
controlled entities, brought the U.S. sanctions in line with the U.N. measures. See Exec. Order No. 12,846,
58 Fed. Reg. 25,771 (Apr. 25, 1993); see also Exec. Order No. 12,934, 59 Fed. Reg. 54,117 (Oct. 25, 1994).
The blocking measures directed at Serbia and Montenegro were prospectively lifted inJanuary 1996 as a result
of the Dayton Peace Accords, 61 Fed. Reg. 1282 (Jan. 19, 1996); 31 C.F.R. § 585.525 (2000)), but were not
similarly lifted for the Serbian-controlled areas of Bosnia until May. 61 Fed. Reg. 24,697 (May 16, 1996); 31
C.F.R. § 585.527 (2000), when the Serb forces withdrew. Sanctions were then re-imposed in 1998 because of
Serbian actions in Kosovo. See Exec. Order No. 13,088, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,109 (June 9, 1998); 31 C.F.R. § 586
(2000). Following the recent elections, a new licensing policy was adopted in October 2000. See Office of
Foreign Assets Control, Statement of Licensing Policy Relating to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/bulletin.txt (visited Dec. 12, 2000).
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present),8 Colombia (1995-present), 89 Burma (1997-present), 90 Sudan (1997-present), 91 and
Afghanistan (1999-present). 92 Additionally, the U.S. government recently created several
more programs that are not necessarily tied to any one specific country, imposing economic
sanctions on Middle Eastern terrorists (1995-present), 9 governments that support terror-
ism (1996-present), 94 foreign terrorist organizations (1997-present),9 those engaged in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (1998-present), 96 and most recently, those
engaged in narcotics trafficking (2000-present).97
88. Sanctions were initially imposed only on dealings with National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA), and later expanded. See Exec. Order No. 12,865, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,005 (Sept. 26, 1993); Exec.
Order No. 13,069, 62 Fed. Reg. 65,989 (Dec. 12, 1997); Exec. Order No. 13,098, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,471 (Aug.
19, 1998). The UNITA (Angola) Sanctions Regulations (UASR) essentially block assets of those affiliated with
UNITA and impose an arms embargo and prohibit actions that facilitate the sale of arms or petroleum products
to UNITA or Angola. See 58 Fed. Reg. 64,904 (Dec. 10, 1993). However, Executive Order Number 13,098
required so many changes to the details of the regulations that the UASR were entirely reissued in August
1999. See 64 Fed. Reg. 43,924 (Aug. 12, 1999); 31 C.F.R. § 590 (2000).
89. See Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 Fed. Reg. 54,579 (Oct. 21, 1995). The IEEPA-based Narcotics Traf-
ficking Sanctions Regulations (NTSR) was created in March 1997. See 31 C.F.R. § 536 (2000). These sanctions
are primarily targeted at the Cali Cartel, unlike the broader scope of the recent Kingpin Act sanctions. See
infra note 97 and accompanying text.
90. The Government of Burma, or Myanmar, was sanctioned in May 1997 for its "large-scale repression of
the democratic opposition" by the imposition of a prohibition on any new investment in the country with the
Burmese Sanctions Regulations (BSR). See Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (May 20, 1997); see
also 63 Fed. Reg. 27,846 (May 21, 1998); Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 537 (2000).
91. The government of Sudan was sanctioned in November 1997 for its support of terrorism, efforts to
destabilize its neighbors, and for human-rights violations within Sudan. See Exec. Order No. 13,067, 62 Fed.
Reg. 59,989 (Nov. 3, 1997). The Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR) are found at 31 C.F.R § 538 (2000).
92. Sanctions were imposed on dealing with the Taliban in Afghanistan on July 6, 1999. See Exec. Order
No. 13,129, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,759 (July 4, 1999); Taliban (Afghanistan) Sanctions Regulations (TASR), 66 Fed.
Reg. 2,726-41 (Jan. 11, 2001) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 545).
93. In January 1995, sanctions were imposed that prohibit dealings with designated terrorists and terrorist
organizations deemed to pose a threat to the Middle East peace process. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg.
5,079 (Jan. 23, 1995). The Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (TSR) were created in February 1996. 61 Fed.
Reg. 3,805 (1996), 31 C.F.R. § 595 (2000). The sanctions programs targeted at the Terrorism List Govern-
ments, see infra note 94, and Foreign Terrorist Organizations, see infra note 95, are predicated upon the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, rather than IEEPA.
94. The Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations (TLGSR), 31 C.F.R. § 596 (2000), and the
Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR), 31 C.F.R. § 597 (2000), are unusual among
the recent sanctions programs in that they are not predicated upon IEEPA. The TLGSR were issued under
the authority of section 321 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, §§ 302-03, 110 Stat. 1214, 1248-53 (1996), and prohibit unlicensed financial dealings with any government
designated by the Secretary of State as supporting terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Adminis-
tration Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405 (1994). This currently affects dealings with Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, Sudan, and Syria. See 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2000). All, except Syria, however, are countries that are
already affected by other OFAC sanctions programs.
95. The Foreign Terrorist Organization Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR), 31 C.F.R.§ 597 (2000), like the
TLGSR, 31 C.F.R. § 596 (2000), are not predicated upon IEEPA. The FTOSR were issued under the authority
of sections 302-03 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132 at §§ 302-
03, 110 Stat. at 1248-52 (1996), and prohibit providing material support or resources to designated terrorist
organizations and also require blocking the assets of such organizations.
96. Certain persons engaged in weapons proliferation are subject to an import ban. Initially established in
1998 by Executive Order Number 13,094, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,803 (July 23, 1998), the ban was implemented with
the Weapons of Mass Destruction Trade Control Regulations (WIMDTCR), 31 C.F.R. § 539 (2000).
97. Although the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act was enacted in late 1999, 21 U.S.C. § 1902, Pub. L. No.
106-120, §§ 801-11, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 113 Stat. 1606, 1626-36 (1999), it
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Apart from the various Asian sanctions, which were administered with a single common
set of regulations,"0 the government created entirely new and separate stand-alone regula-
tions for each of these various sanctions programs.99 Nevertheless, virtually every one of
these programs employs some sort of blacklist tool.""° The OFAC blacklists were tradition-
ally used to expand the scope of the sanctions beyond a particular target destination, to
reach third parties and corporate cloaks operating outside the sanctioned country.10 OFAC
effectively deems these blacklisted parties to be agents, for all purposes, or nationals of the
sanctioned target. Therefore, dealings with blacklisted parties are the same as direct dealings
with the sanctioned destination. 102 Thus, for example, in declaring Pierre Boileau to be a
"specially designated national" of Cuba, OFAC is attempting to bring indirect dealings with
a Cuban intermediary within the ambit of its prohibitions on direct dealings with Cuba. 03
The terminology associated with each programs' blacklist vary however, as the govern-
ment slightly restructures the basic sanctions mechanisms each time it drafts a new program.
A confusing array of different terms, such as "specially designated,"' 104 "controlled,"'101
"blocked,""'" or "governmental" °7 persons or entities, is employed in conjunction with the
blacklists used for the various programs. The purpose of the blacklist within each program,
however, remains unaltered-to extend the reach of the sanctions beyond just the geography
associated with a target country to reach transactions involving specific individuals or or-
ganizations wherever they may be located.
In several of the newer programs, specific parties or organizations are blacklisted arguably
without any direct connection to any particular state or geography whatsoever. 08 In the
narco-trafficking, terrorist, and weapons proliferation programs, blacklisting is no longer
employed as a secondary tool to reach the activities of corporate cloaks or third parties that
might enable a targeted country to avoid the effects of the sanctions. Rather, in these
programs, blacklisting is now employed as the primary tool for achieving the government's
objectives. The government's objectives have also shifted-from isolating the sanctioned
territory as a prelude or alternative to war-to demonstrating political leadership or claim-
ing the moral high ground for political purposes, with considerably less concern for whether
the sanctions will actually affect the actions of their intended target. That is, blacklisting is
increasingly employed not for foreign policy purposes but in an attempt to address some
of the more intractable political problems facing policy makers today, such as human rights
was not untilJune 1, 2000, that the president used the statute's authority to issue his initial blacklist designations.
See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Wat You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions Against Drug Traffickers,
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/tl ldrugs.pdf (visited Aug. 11, 2000). The controls were implemented
with the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations (FNKSR), 65 Fed. Reg. 41,334 (July 5, 2000) (to
be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 598).
98. The embargoes of China, Vietnam, and Cambodia were all administered by OFAC under the FACR,
as is the current embargo of North Korea. See supra notes 70-71, 73-75 and accompanying text.
99. See soipra notes 72, 78-97 and accompanying text.
100. Only the Burma program lacks a clear blacklist tool as part of its sanctions. See supra note 90.
101. See Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 83.
102. See id.
103. See id.; see also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
104. See Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 98-99
105. See id. at 99-102.
106. See id. at 100-03.
107. See id. at 103-06.
108. See supra notes 93-97; see also Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 27-28.
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violations, terrorism, and matters of outright illegality, such as narco-trafficking. 1°9 There
are currently over 4,800 parties blacklisted under one or more of OFAC's various
programs. I I°
C. APPLICATION OF BLACKLISTS ABROAD: FOREIGN BRANCHES AND SUBSIDIARIES...
Seeking to influence the behavior of others beyond the reach of U.S. jurisdiction, through
either leadership or coercion, is one of the basic functions of both the various OFAC black-
lists and the BXA Entities List. The government seeks to influence the decisions of those
beyond its reach by controlling the behavior of those within the United States and, in an
effort to bring as much pressure to bear as possible, U.S. affiliated parties abroad as well.
This raises the question of whether parties outside the United States can be required to
adhere to U.S. economic sanctions or trade controls, which may have no counterpart in
the local laws where they are operating.
Clearly, U.S. nationals and companies are fully obligated to follow U.S. laws and
regulations, whether operating in the United States or abroad."l 2 More significantly,
however, the United States sometimes regards foreign companies or juridical entities
as being subject to requirements of U.S. sanctions programs. OFAC's older, TWVEA-
based sanctions programs on Cuba and North Korea, in particular, are specifically de-
signed to reach to the farthest possible limits"13 of U.S. legislative or prescriptive jurisdic-
109. See Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 27-28.
110. The most recent publication of the consolidated OFAC blacklist on OFAC's website lists over 4,800
separate entries, many with multiple aliases or addresses. Of these, approximately 474 individuals or entities
are identified as Cuban Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) and vessels; 662 as Libyan SDNs; seven as North
Korean SDNs; 410 as Iraqi SDNs and vessels; 141 are blocked as affiliated with the Sudanese Government;
17 are blocked as affiliated with the Taliban; 26 are blocked as affiliated with UNITA in Angola; 1,117 are
blocked as affiliated with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under the Kosovo sanctions; 156 are Specially
Designated Terrorists (SDT) and 134 are Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) [and 87 of those bear a dual
SDT-FTO designation]; 659 are Colombian narcotics traffickers (SDNTs); and 56 are designated as SDNTKs
under the Drug Kingpin Act sanctions; additionally, 20 Iranian controlled banks are listed, along with 859
SDNs under the FRY (S&M) sanctions and 87 SRBHs under the Bosnian sanctions even though those programs
are currently suspended. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons
(Dec. 7, 2000), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/tl lsdn.pdf. This does not include the Designated For-
eign Parties (DFP) sanctioned under the WMDTCR and identified in 31 C.F.R. § 539, app. 1 (2000), or the
Terrorism List Governments sanctioned under the TLGSR and identified in 31 C.F.R. § 596.201 (2000). See
supra notes 94-96, and accompanying text.
111. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 35-41, 61-70.
112. International law, as reflected in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, generally recognizes four
bases for a state's "jurisdiction to prescribe," all of which are subject to a reasonableness limitation. These
overlapping bases are: the territorial principle (a state may proscribe activity occurring within its boundaries);
the effects principle (a state may proscribe activity having an effect within its territory); the nationality principle
(a state may proscribe activities of its nationals, wherever located); and the security principle (a state may
proscribe activities affecting its national security). Regulating the activity of citizens, residents, or companies
formed under a state's laws would be a classic application of the nationality principle supporting jurisdiction
to proscribe. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-03 (1987).
113. For example, the basic prohibitions in the CACR extend to all dealings, direct or indirect, between
Cuba, Cuban nationals, or Cuban SDNs, and "any person (including a banking institution) subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States." 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201(a)(1), (b)(1) (2000). The prohibitions also extend to
"any property or property interest subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" in which Cuba, Cuban
Nationals, or Cuban SDNs have or had "any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect." Id. at
§§ 515.201(b)(2), 500.201(b). The basic prohibitions in the FACR are similar to the CACR. Compare 31 C.F.R.
§§ 515.201(a), (b), with 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201(a), (b).
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tion."' By definition, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, or those that are controlled
in fact by U.S. nationals or companies, are considered to be "persons subject to the juris-
diction of the United States" and obligated to comply with U.S. sanctions despite being
established abroad under foreign laws." 5 Thus, under U.S. law, America Online's subsidiary
in Canada is obligated to follow the terms of the U.S. embargo of Cuba.'
1 6
Given the wartime origins of TWEA and the circumstances that were historically asso-
ciated with the use of economic sanctions, broadly requiring U.S.-affiliated parties outside
the country to support and follow such sanctions, makes sense and is a necessary corollary
to an effective set of controls." 7 In fact, the regulatory definition that brings controlled
foreign subsidiaries within the scope of "persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States""' 8 is directly traceable to a Treasury Department notice issued during the early
months of World War 11.119 Nevertheless, the legitimate, reasonable use of such a broad
claim of regulatory power was recognized as being confined to unusual circumstances.
Blacklisting is very easy to employ and very amenable to targeting specific parties abroad
who might otherwise be beyond the reach of U.S. processes, which makes it an attractive
tool for policy makers and regulators. The government merely needs to add individuals and
organizations to a list in order to have control and be seen as acting on an issue. The risk
is that overuse of extraterritorial sanctions generates conflict with other governments who
perceive the U.S. rules as impinging on their own jurisdiction and sovereign interests. This
is particularly likely to occur when multilateral agreement on the object of the control is
lacking. l""
114. The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law conceptually distinguishes, under international law, between
a state's power to legislate or proscribe-the "authority of a state to make its substantive laws applicable to
particular persons or in particular circumstances"-and its ability actually to enforce those laws. See RESTATE-
MENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 112, at § 401. The state's jurisdiction to proscribe is subject only
to a reasonableness limitation. See id. § 403.
115. The term "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" is defined in the CACR to include
(1) U.S. citizens and residents; (2) "person[s] within the United States" (which itself is defined in 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.330 (2000)); (3) corporations organized under the laws of the United States; and (4) "any corporation,
partnership, or association, wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by" U.S. citizens,
residents, or corporations. 31 C.F.R. § 515.329 (a) (d) (2000) (emphasis added). The same definition appears
in the FACR. See id. § 500.329.
116. Canada has a different view and opposes the extraterritorial application of U.S. law to Canadian na-
tionals and companies. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; see also Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 98-99.
118. TWEA's broad grant of authority to the president to take action with regard to "any person, or with
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" is not further defined within the
statute. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1)(B) (1994).
119. U.S. Treasury Pub. Circular No. 18, 7 Fed. Reg. 2,503 (Apr. 1, 1942).
120. Naturally, this can present conflict of laws issues, especially if there are local laws or policies that take
a different view of the policy objective behind the U.S. sanctions. A number of jurisdictions, such as Canada,
Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, oppose the extraterritorial application of U.S. sanc-
tions on Cuba to their nationals and companies. See Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 61-70. Canada, for example,
directs Canadian nationals and companies to refrain from cooperating with the U.S. embargo of Cuba and
further requires that they also report any and all comnmunications requesting their cooperation or support for
the embargo to the Canadian Attorney General. This is embodied in Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Mea-
sures Act of 1985 (FEMA), R.S.C., ch. F-29, §§ 1-11 (1985) (Can.), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 794 [hereinafter
FEMA]. As the U.S. policy toward Cuba was tightened, first with the Cuban Democracy Act, and then with
the LIBERTAD or Helms-Burton Act, so too FEMA was amended to counter the tougher U.S. policies.
FEMA was substantially amended by Bill C-54, which was passed in late 1996, and became effective on January
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An increased U.S. sensitivity to the strength and legitimacy of the objections of foreign
governments to the assertion of jurisdiction over non-U.S. companies, perhaps albeit com-
1, 1997. See An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, Bill C-54 (1996) (Can.), reprinted in
36 I.L.M. 111, at 115-24 (1997). The only Order currently in effect under FEMA specifically evokes its
provisions with regard to the U.S. Helms-Burton Act. See Schedule to FEMA, 36 I.L.M. at 124 (1997). This
is an amended version of the original Order issued in 1992, which triggered FEMA with regard to the Cuban
Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-10 (1994). See generally 24 I.L.M. 794 (1985). Both Orders are predicated
upon a Canadian belief that the extraterritorial application of these U.S. laws "adversely affect significant
Canadian [trading] interests ... or. .. infringe[s] Canadian sovereignty." FEMA, § 5. Violations are punishable
with fines of up to Can. $1.5 million and terms of imprisonment of up to five years. See id. § 7(1)(a). FEvIA
goes beyond simply prohibiting compliance with extraterritorial laws from other jurisdictions. It is also a
"blocking measure," designed to insulate Canadian nationals and companies from foreign attempts to enforce
their extraterritorial requirements or penalize their violation. In an effort to limit the clear conflict of law issues
that such blocking measures create, FEMA only applies to three types of situations. First, it applies to particular
foreign trade laws that are designated as being "contrary to international law or comity." 36 I.L.M at 118.
These designations are accomplished by an Order issued by the Canadian Attorney General, after consultation
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which amends a Schedule of foreign trade laws to which FEMA applies.
The Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD) Act is the only trade law that currently appears in the FEMA schedule. See
FEMA, § 2.1. Second, it applies to situations where a foreign state or tribunal takes actions that adversely affect
Canadian interests in international trade and commerce. The Canadian interests in trade or commerce that
are adversely affected must be, at least in part, within Canada. See generally FEMA, §§ 3, 5, 8. Third, it applies
to situations where a foreign state or tribunal takes actions that adversely affect Canadian sovereignty. See id.
The basic prohibition on Canadian residents, nationals, and companies complying with designated foreign
trade laws or measures is found in a provision that states that the Canadian Attorney General may "prohibit
any person in Canada from complying with such measures, or with any directives, instructions, "intimations
of policy" or other communications relating to such measures from a person who is in a position to direct or
influence the policies of the person in Canada." Id. § 5(l)(b). A variety of different blocking techniques are
then employed to augment the basic prohibition on complying with offensive foreign laws. First, there is the
reporting requirement, which presumably permits the Canadian government to both monitor attempts to
compel enforcement of extraterritorial measures within Canada, and to intervene on a state-to-state level, if
necessary. The reporting requirement states that the Canadian Attorney General may "require any person in
Canada to give notice to [the Attorney General] of such measures, or of any directives, instructions, intimations
of policy or other communications relating to such measures from a person who is in a position to direct or
influence the policies of the person in Canada." Id. § 5(l)(a). The reporting requirement, like the basic pro-
hibition, is quite broadly worded, reaching even intimations of policy, which may be conveyed by a corporate
parent or affiliate, for example. Id. Second, in order to frustrate the enforcement of extraterritorial requirements,
Canadian citizens or residents may be prohibited from producing, disclosing, or identifying records or infor-
mation sought by foreign tribunals. In appropriate cases, Canadian courts are even empowered to order the
seizure of records in Canada to prevent their disclosure. See id. § 4. Third, recognition and enforcement of any
foreign judgments that are rendered regarding offensive extraterritorial measures may be prohibited, or their
awards reduced. See id. § 8(l)(b). This section is applicable primarily to antitrust awards, and designated trade
laws set forth in the FEMA schedule. It is also bolstered by another section, which specifically prohibits the
enforcement in Canada of any awards made under the U.S. Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD) Act, irrespective of
whether Helms-Burton appears on the FEMA schedule at the time. See id. § 7.1, 36 I.L.M. at 121. Finally,
Canadian residents, citizens, or companies are given the right to "clawback" any awards that foreign parties
may have recovered elsewhere in a new cause of action. That is, the Canadian party who loses in a foreign
forum may sue the foreign party for the amount of the judgment the foreign party obtained, the expenses
incurred in both the foreign action and the Canadian clawback suit, and for any consequential losses or damages
suffered by the Canadian party because of the foreign judgment. See FEMA § 9. The Canadian award resulting
from a clawback action may itself be executed not only against the foreign party, but also against the property
of any person or entity, which owns or controls, or is part of a group that owns or controls, the foreign party
who obtained the impugned foreign judgment. Thus, this permits the clawback award to be executed against
any parent company property located within Canadian jurisdiction, or the property of other members of a
holding corporation or group. See id. § 9(2).
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bined with declining U.S. political and economic hegemony, led the United States to back
away from the expansive approach it claimed in the TWEA-based programs as new eco-
nomic sanctions began to be established in the late 1970s and 1980s.12' By that time, Con-
gress was also concerned that the Korean War era national emergency' was too stale to
confer extraordinary powers upon the president.2' Upon investigation,14 Congress deter-
mined that not one, but four, ongoing emergencies delegated broad, extraordinary powers
to the president,"'s which Congress then attempted to curtail with new legislation.2' One
result of this effort was the passage of IEEPA,127 which removed the national emergency
authority from TWEA entirely,2' except for the then-existing programs,2 9 confining
TWEA once again to being a wartime grant of authority. 3°
Rather than limiting the president in practice, separate emergencies declared under
IEEPA supported the imposition of more economic sanctions programs in the past twenty
years than were created in the seventy years prior to the amendment of TWEA in 1977.""
However, while the statutory language continues to broadly empower the president to act
with regard to any property or persons "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, ""'
121. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
122. The emergency was President Truman's declaration used to support the imposition of economic sanc-
tions on China at the time of the Korean War. Proclamation No. 2,914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9,092 (Dec. 16, 1950).
President Truman's declaration remains the basis for the FACR and CACR in effect today. See Presidential
Determination No. 96-43, 61 Fed. Reg. 46,529 (Aug. 27, 1996).
123. The courts, however, have rejected arguments that a stale declaration of an emergency is insufficient
to trigger the delegation of extraordinary power to the president, leaving it to Congress to speak on the matter.
See Welch v. Kennedy, 319 F. Supp. 945, 947-48 (D.D.C. 1970).
124. The Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency was created injanuary
1973. S. Res. 9, 93d Cong. (1973). Various investigations into the use of presidential emergency power pro-
ceeded through 1976, as one outgrowth of the realignment of executive and legislative power in the aftermath
of both Watergate and Vietnam. See House Subcomm. on International Trade and Commerce, Committee
on International Relations, Trading with the Enemy: Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Reg-
ulations of International Transactions in Time of Declared National Emergency, 94th Cong. (1976).
125. These included President Roosevelt's Bank Holiday emergency, Proclamation No. 2039,48 Stat. 1691
(Mar. 6, 1933); President Truman's Korean Conflict emergency, Proclamation No. 2,914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9,029
(Dec. 16, 1950); President Nixon's emergency relating to work stoppage by Postal Service employees, Proc-
lamation No. 3972, 3 C.F.R. § 473 (1970); and President Nixon's balance of payments emergency, which was
used to support supplemental duties on imports, Proclamation No. 4,074, 3 C.F.R. § 60 (1971).
126. The initial result was the passage of the National Emergencies Act of 1976, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621,
1622, 1631, 1641, 1651 (1994), which terminated all presidential powers granted by virtue of past declarations
of emergencies, but which exempted, inter alia, emergencies declared under TWEA. See 50 U.S.C. § 165 1(a)(1)
(1994).
127. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1994).
128. See Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(a), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (striking the "during any other period of national
emergency declared by the President" language from TWEA § 5(b); 50 U.S.C. App. § 5, Historical Notes
(1994)).
129. Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977), authorized the continuation of the then existing
programs until 1978, and the president's ability to annually renew them from 1978 forward. See 50 U.S.C.
App. § 5, Historical Notes (1994); Presidential Determination No. 96-43, 61 Fed. Reg. 46,529 (Aug. 27, 1996).
130. Other than the procedural mechanisms for triggering their application, the actual grants of authority
to the president under TWEA and IEEPA are very similar. TWEA does differ from IEEPA in authorizing
the wartime expropriation or vesting of enemy property in the government, as well as broad powers to regulate
domestic transactions, and the ability to seize bullion and records. Compare 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)(1) (1994),
with 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (1994).
131. Compare supra notes 78-97, with supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
132. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(B) (1994).
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the actual sanctions imposed under IEEPA have generally taken a more limited approach.
Rather than seeking to reach the farthest limits authorized in prescribing the behavior of
U.S.-affiliated foreign companies, most of the IEEPA economic sanctions only impose ob-
ligations upon U.S. persons.'33 The distinction is that the term U.S. person typically ex-
cludes foreign controlled subsidiaries of U.S. companies, although it does include overseas
branches (entities that lack any status as a foreign juridical person) within its ambit.
3 4
The United States's ability and willingness to ameliorate the extraterritorial reach of its
economic sanctions following the passage of IEEPA related to two factors. First, a more
limited political objective underlies several of the more recent sanctions, particularly in
those programs focused on targets in this hemisphere (e.g., Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti,
Colombian narco-traffickers). 35 Second, many of the targets that otherwise might have
been subjected to more expansive sanctions were also the subject of sanctions programs by
other countries, acting pursuant to directives from the U.N. Security Council 36 (e.g., South
Africa and Namibia, Iraq and Kuwait, the former Yugoslavia, Angola, and to a lesser degree,
Libya and Iran)." 7 Where there is substantial multilateral cooperation on sanctioning a
particular target country, there is less practical need for broad extraterritorial controls by
any one country such as the United States, and perhaps less justification as well.
In the trade control area, the broad authority granted in the EAA 13 ' was used to extend
the regulations to control transfers abroad of either U.S.-origin items or foreign products
that are the "direct products" of U.S.-origin technology, irrespective of who is involved in
the transaction.' 3 9 In addition to these product-oriented provisions, the EAR imported
133. The definition of "U.S. persons" is essentially the same in OFAC's IEEPA-based economic sanctions
and in the Commerce Department's special trade controls regulating the activities of"U.S. persons" that might
contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by others in third countries under the EAR. See
15 C.F.R. § 744.9(b) (2000). Nonetheless, the definition of U.S. persons used in the IEEPA-based economic
sanctions and the EAR's nonproliferation controls should not be confused with the same term as used in the
Export Administration Act Amendments of 1977, which introduced a number of prohibitions regarding U.S.
participation in the Arab League's boycott of Israel. The definition of "U.S. person" used in the antiboycott
law includes controlled-in-fact foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies and is therefore substantially the same
as "persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction" under the OFAC economic sanctions programs. See Export Admin-
istration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235; 50 U.S.C. App. § 2407 (1994), 15 C.F.R.
§ 760.1 (2000). This only serves to highlight that when dealing with the various U.S. trade control programs
even common terms can have arcane implications, which are not consistently applied from program to program.
134. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 536.316 (NTSR); § 537.314 (BSR); § 538.315 (SSR); § 550.308 (LSR); § 560.314
(ITR); § 570.321 (KACR); § 575.321 (IACR); § 585.317 (FRYSR); § 586.319 (KSR); § 590.309 (UASR);
§ 595.315 (TSR); § 597.319 (FTOSR) (2000); and the analogous provision of the FNKSR, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,334,
41,339 (2000) (to be codified at C.F.R. § 598.318).
135. See supra notes 81, 83, 86, 89 and accompanying text.
136. It should be noted that even where the UN has called for sanctions, the U.S. sanctions programs are
often more stringent or go beyond the action sought by the UN, as with the South African, Iranian, and Libyan
sanctions, for example. In other cases, the U.S. sanctions preceded action by the UN, as was the case with the
sanctions on Iraq/Kuwait and on the former Yugoslavia.
137. Also note that the UN Participation Act provides a coordinate basis for the U.S. sanctions in each of
these cases. See supra notes 78, 80, 83-85, 87-88 and accompanying text. It would not be correct, however, to
assume that IEEPA is no longer used as the sole basis for sanctions. The blocking of terrorist assets in January
1995, under Executive Order 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5,079 (Jan. 23, 1995) and the addition of new restrictions
on contracts to develop Iranian petroleum resources under Executive Order 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar.
15, 1995) in 1995 were ordered solely on the president's authority under IEEPA.
138. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2404-05.
139. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 730.5 (2000).
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OFAC's "U.S. person" approach in the mid-1990s to restrict U.S. involvement with weap-
ons proliferation activities abroad as part of the EPCI program, 14° irrespective of what is
involved in the transaction. 41 Thus, two levels of control are actually created under the
EAR with regard to transactions abroad with blacklisted parties. Transactions with those
named on either the DPL or the Entities List involving most items subject to the EAR are
prohibited-even when conducted by foreign persons-simply because they concern U.S.-
origin items or the products of U.S. technology.' 42 Accordingly, U.S. origin Dell Computers
may neither be directly exported, nor retransferred abroad (re-exported) to the Baltic State
Technical University."3 In addition, U.S. nationals, residents, or companies-including
their overseas branches-are subject to still further restrictions on performing "any con-
tract, license, or employment" with those blacklisted on the Entity List due to their in-
volvement in weapons proliferation activities.' 4 Thus, Dell's foreign subsidiaries might
theoretically be able to deal with the Baltic State Technical University, so long as no U.S.
nationals, products, or technology are involved. However, this might be quite difficult in
practice, depending upon the involvement or level of support provided by the U.S. parent
company to the operations of its overseas subsidiaries, because of the broad prohibitions
restricting the ability of Dell in the United States to knowingly participate in or facilitate
proscribed activities by those designated on the Entities List."'
II. Governmental Blacklists and Screening Obligations
Given these requirements, it's striking that there is no regulatory obligation to actually
check transactions, customers, or trading partners against the government's blacklists."46
No penalties are imposed for failing to institute a screening process, so long as no imper-
missible transactions occur. Additionally, as a practical matter, relatively few, if any, trans-
actions will occur with blacklisted parties for most businesses. Nevertheless, with the gov-
ernment blacklisting more than 5,000 individuals, companies, or organizations around the
world, there is a substantial risk in ignoring the possibility that an impermissible transaction
might occur.
Conducting some form of screening actually serves two purposes for any business. First,
it helps to identify problematic transactions from among the larger background of entirely
permissible dealings. Second, in the event that an impermissible transaction does occur, it
140. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 730.5(d), 736.2(7), 744.6, 744.9 (2000).
142. See id. §§ 736.2(b)(4), (5); 744.1(c). Note that the U.S. government permission to proceed with these
types of transactions usually must be in the form of an actual license approval. The license exceptions that are
set forth in the regulations (see id. § 732) are typically unavailable when dealing with denied parties or those
named on the Entity List. See id. §§ 736.2(b)(4), 744.1(c).
143. See id.
144. See id. §§ 744.1(c), 744.6.
145. See id. §§ 744.6, 744.10. Questions might also be raised in this sort of a transaction-depending on
how the overseas transaction actually arose-regarding whether Dell in the United States was involved in an
attempt to impermissibly evade the EAR controls. See id. § 764.2(h). However, it is perhaps also likely that
Dell's overseas subsidiaries deal in products that are "subject to the EAR" in any event, which would bring
this hypothetical transaction within the scope of the type of control discussed at notes 142-143, supra, and
accompanying text.
146. Screening is, however, required for holders of "special comprehensive licenses" under the EAR. See id.
§ 752.
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helps to document efforts at good faith compliance and negate or at least mitigate any
possible penalties. 147 Accordingly, the government strongly encourages screening in its com-
pliance guidance. 48 However, most of this guidance, and presumably most of the companies
who are screening their customers and vendors, are primarily concerned with traditional
export transactions. The government's controls and most internal business compliance sys-
tems were crafted against a background of cross-border transfers of tangible items, often
financed as a documentary sale or letter of credit transaction that depended upon the in-
volvement of numerous third parties and, most of all, took time to complete.' 49 In contrast,
e-commerce enables much faster transactions, in both tangible and intangible goods and
services, with a broader range of both payment mechanisms and parties. The government's
controls generally do not reflect the newer e-commerce business models. Perhaps as a result,
the general awareness of the government's requirements, and the level of compliance among
most e-commerce companies appear to be quite low.
Screening, as typically employed in most internal business compliance programs, involves
matching customer and vendor or trading partner account information with the various
blacklist entries, often through the use of software designed for that purpose 50 Although
it might be possible to distinguish between those regulatory controls that limit their extra-
territorial effect to "U.S. persons" and those that apply more broadly, many businesses
simply run an automated screen against all the names on the combined blacklist, and wait
until there is a match before examining the scope of the actual control to be applied in a
particular case. Periodic re-screening of the customer/vendor database becomes necessary
whenever there is a change in either the parties with whom the business deals or in one of
the blacklists. As this may be awkward or difficult to predict, many businesses further in-
corporate blacklist screening into their transaction-by-transaction order processing system.
A number of companies have grown up in recent years to assist those businesses that do
not choose to establish their own screening compliance programs.''
In general, businesses subject to U.S. jurisdiction are strictly liable for any impermissible
dealings with blacklisted parties, and may face civil and administrative penalties for even
inadvertent violations." 2 Lack of knowledge that the other party to a transaction is black-
147. This may be particularly important both to convincing a government agency to exercise its prosecutorial
discretion, or at least to secure some benefit under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in the event of a conviction.
See Fitzgerald, supra note 39, Ch. 14.
148. See, e.g., Bureau of Export Administration, Export Management System Guidelines, Element 1: Denied
Persons Screen, available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/PDF/Screenl.pdf (visited Dec. 12, 2000); Office of Foreign
Assets Controls, Foreign Assets Control Regulations for the Financial Community, available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/ofac/tl lfacbk.pdf (visited Dec. 12, 2000); Office of Foreign Assets Controls, Export Compli-
ance; Don't Neglect OFAC (Part 2), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/sia2.pdf (visited Dec. 12, 2000).
149. See Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 94.
150. See Bureau of Export Administration, Export Management System FAQs Denied Persons List Screening,
available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Compliance/EMSFAQs.html (visited Dec. 12, 2000).
151. See, e.g., OCR-Inc.com, Compliant Trade: Knowing Your Partner in the Marketplace, available at
http://www.ocr-inc.com/ (visited Dec. 12, 2000); MSR The e-Customs Company, About Visual Compliance
Online, available at http://www.visualexporter.com/compliancemetasystem/about.cfm (visited Dec. 12, 2000);
VASTERA, Why Leading Manufacturers and Distributors use the EMS 2000 Solution from Vastera, available at
http://www.vastera.com/pressroom/white-paper3.htm (visited Dec. 12, 2000).
152. With regard to BXA's trade controls, see General Prohibition Four: Engaging in Actions Prohibited
by a Denial Order, 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(4) (2000); Standard Terms of Orders Denying Export Privileges, id.
pt. 764 Supp. No. 1; and Administrative Sanctions id. § 764.3(a). With regard to DTC's trade controls, see 22
C.F.R. § 127.10 (2000). See also supra note 21 and accompanying text. With regard to OFAC embargoes, see
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listed is significant only when impermissible dealings with those on the Entities List are at
issue, when arguing whether an ostensibly domestic transaction is export-related,' or when
criminal penalties are involved.'1 4 Otherwise, a business's level of knowledge, like the pres-
ence of an internal controls system aimed at preventing impermissible transactions, is more
properly a factor to be considered when exercising prosecutorial discretion or mitigating
penalties in a particular case, rather than something that negates the violation altogether."'
While new business models involving online-or even fully automated-transactions do
permit a greater degree of anonymity regarding one's customers and trading partners, they
do not insulate e-businesses from the exposures associated with dealing with blacklisted
parties. Although anonymous online transactions might be unlikely to come to the attention
of government enforcement officials, truly anonymous e-commerce transactions remain
rare-especially if payment is to be provided for the goods or services obtained online.
Entirely apart from the matter of payment, data mining--acquiring, collating, and analyzing
information regarding customers and trading partners-is an increasingly critical part of
establishing the distinguishing elements of any e-business operation. Thus, during the or-
dinary course of their operations, most e-businesses will acquire sufficient information con-
cerning the identity of their customers and trading partners to trigger these governmental
controls.
The application of the traditional strict liability approach to online transactions with
blacklisted parties can be seen, for example, in the way OFAC regards automated payment
processing systems-online systems that are intended to process transactions completely,
without any human intervention whatsoever. For many years OFAC was especially lenient
with financial institutions when blacklisted parties slipped through the software ordinarily
used to interdict their handling of impermissible transactions in their automated processes.
In 1995, however, the agency announced that
It has been determined that it is no longer appropriate to treat fully-automated financial trans-
actions that violate economic sanctions prohibitions as being beyond a financial institution's
knowledge or intent... [OFAC] will no longer treat the fully-automated processing of violative
transactions as a full defense in civil penalty proceedings." 6
Of the three principal agencies generating these blacklists, BXA is arguably the most
attuned to the demands and requirements of e-commerce. It has attempted to grapple with
a number of the problems presented by online transactions in its "deemed export" rules for
domestic transfers of technology,' de minimis provisions for the extraterritorial application
for example, 31 C.F.R. § 515.701(a)(3) (2000) (civil penalty authority under Cuban embargo). See also supra
notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
154. See General Prohibition Five: Export or Reexport to Prohibited End-Uses or End-Users, 15 C.F.R.
§ 736.2(b)(5) (2000), which states "(y)ou may not, without a license, knowingly export or reexport any item
subject to the EAR to an end-user ... that is prohibited by part 744 of the EAR" (emphasis added). See also
supra notes 20-21, 29-31, 62-65 and accompanying text.
155. See, for example, 15 C.F.R.§ 764.5(e)(4) (2000), which includes whether the impermissible act was
intentional or inadvertent as a consideration when evaluating what administrative sanctions to impose following
a voluntary disclosure of a violation.
156. See Compliance with 31 CFR Chapter V with Respect to Fully-Automated Financial Transactions, 60
Fed. Reg. 34,141 (June 30, 1995).
157. Any release of technology or software source code to a non-permanent-resident foreign national is
deemed to be an export to that individual's home country. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii) (2000); seealso Bureau
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of its controls to goods and technology transferred abroad,' and in the rules formulated
to deal specifically with online transfers of encryption technology and software. 15 9 OFAC
is arguably at the other end of the spectrum, having traditionally focused primarily on
financial dealings by major institutions that take some time to be executed. Although OFAC
is making increased use of the Internet to distribute its materials and blacklists,'16 it has
largely failed to provide guidance on how to adapt its requirements to the pace and demands
of e-commerce.61 DTC is somewhere in between, but perhaps unlike the other two agen-
cies, is less likely to see its controls on munitions items to be a major concern for most
online businesses. The level of sophistication reflected in the agencies' own controls is
perhaps some indication of how amenable they might be to entertaining the discretion to
excuse or mitigate an inadvertent violation by an online business.
BXA, and to a lesser degree DTC, have brought numerous, well-publicized prosecutions
for violations of their trade controls.161 Although several have involved high tech businesses,
none of the published prosecutions were brought solely for failure to screen an online
transaction against the blacklists. 161 OFAC's enforcement actions, at least outside of the
financial community, are much less well-publicized164 There is a perception that a sub-
stantial gap exists between the letter of the law and OFAC's enforcement actions, particu-
larly with regard to retail cash sales and small non-banking transactions with blacklisted
parties.165 The retail sale of a single McDonald's hamburger to Pierre Boileau, for example,
presumably does not merit the resources required for a prosecution, even though there is
no formal de minimis threshold in the OFAC regulations. There is also a perception that
political considerations influence OFAC's prosecutorial discretion. Despite some strong
public statements by the agency, Chelsea Clinton's high school classmates were not pros-
ecuted following a very public, unauthorized trip to Cuba.1' 6 When Bobby Fischer disre-
garded similar warnings regarding playing a championship chess match against Boris Spas-
of Export Administration, Deemed Export Questions and Answers, available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/
DeemedExports/DeemedExportsFAQs.html (visited Dec. 12, 2000).
158. 15 C.F.R. § 734.4(c); pt. 734, Supp. No. 2 (2000).
159. See, for example, 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(9) (2000), addressing the need to screen for IP addresses and
foreign government end-user domain names when transferring encryption software or technology over the
Internet. See also Internet Posting and Sales in Bureau of Export Administration, Commercial Encryption Export
Controls; Questions and Answers (Oct. 19, 2000), at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Encryption/Oct2KQsandAs.html
(visited Dec. 12, 2000).
160. See, e.g., Office of Foreign Assets Control, at http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/ (visited Nov. 17, 2000); see
also Fitzgerald, supra note 25, at 127-29.
161. For example, OFAC declined to respond to a letter and a proposal submitted by IBM on June 10, 1996,
regarding guidance on how Internet service providers should address the possibility that online transactions
might occur with blacklisted parties without their knowledge or participation. See Fitzgerald, supra note 251,
at 116, n.231.
162. See, e.g., Bureau of Export Administration, Don't Let This Happen to YouT!!, athttp://www.bxa.doc.gov/
Enforcement/CaseSummaries/DontLetThisHappen2u.pdf(visited Dec. 12, 2000).
163. See id.
164. There are only eight readily available press releases regarding OFAC enforcement actions over the past
decade. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, Press Releases and Miscellaneous Documents, available at http://
fedbbs.access.gpo.gov/libs/fac_misc.htm (visited Dec. 12, 2000).
165. See Fitzgerald, supra note 36, at 95.
166. See Richard Leiby, A Vacation at Club Red Kids Plan to Flout the Cuba Ban for Some Socialism and
Socializing, WASH. POST, June 3, 1995, at H01; Lois Romano, Cuba Missive Crisis, WAsH. PosT, June 21, 1995,
at D03.
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sky in Yugoslavia, however, he was indicted and is now a fugitive from the United States.167
Nevertheless, the lack of a significant record of public prosecutions should not be surprising,
given the adverse political and public relations consequences that would flow from being
prosecuted for dealing with embargoed destinations, or blacklisted terrorists, weapons pro-
liferators, or narco-traffickers. One would expect that most enforcement actions are settled
or resolved at the earliest possible stages and there are apparently a large number of cases,
principally involving financial institutions that are settled upon payment of civil penalties1 6s
M. Conclusion
Large, sophisticated e-businesses like Walmart.com, Dell Computer, and America Online
will of course take steps to ensure their compliance with the U.S. government's controls
and blacklists. Their extensive customer and trading partner databases will be screened, in
some fashion, against the government's various blacklists. While the fines and criminal
penalties possible for any violations are significant, it is the fear that unseen bureaucrats
might administratively add their names to one of these blacklists that provides the real
motivation to institute a screening process. The possibility that a Walmart.com, a Dell
Computer, or an America Online might be denied access to U.S. goods, technology, or
contractual partners is too great a risk to be assumed as a cost of doing business.
Smaller e-businesses, and especially start-ups, might be tempted to take comfort that
there appear to be relatively few high profile enforcement actions involving impermissible
dealings with blacklisted parties, and conclude that the risks associated with not screening
the information they mine from their online operations are low. However, this reflects a
failure to fully appreciate the impact of the administrative sanctions available to these agen-
cies to enforce their controls. Moreover, relying upon prosecutorial discretion in the event
an impermissible transaction does in fact occur is not always the most prudent business
controls system. Ignoring these blacklists is especially risky when the politics associated
with the underlying governmental control programs are often highly volatile and the public
relations consequences of being seen to be in violation are potentially disastrous.
Additionally, the probability that any particular e-business will find itself inadvertently
dealing with a blacklisted party has dramatically increased over the last decade. New reg-
ulatory programs are proliferating, and the government shows an increasing proclivity to
resort to the blacklisting tool for a host of issues well removed from the traditional core
concerns of foreign policy and trade controls. Trusting that the government will refrain
from prosecuting or blacklisting companies for small or innocent violations may have
worked for some purely domestic businesses in the old economy. Ignoring the government's
blacklists in the new economy, however, must be considered as increasingly suspect. In the
world of global e-commerce, screening customer and trading partner information against
the government's blacklists must become an integral part of an e-business's online data
mining operations.
167. See Jeffrey Young, U.S. to Chess Great Fischer: No Move, UPI NEws, Aug. 14, 1992, available in Lexis
ALLNWS database; see also Where is Bobby Fischer?, at http://www.anusha.com/fugitive.htm (visited Aug. 16,
2000).
168. See, e.g., Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC Compliance: A Perspective for Community Banks, at
http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/aba2.pdf (visited Dec. 12, 2000). There are numerous due process concerns as-
sociated with blacklisting, particularly as it is used by OFAC. See also Fitzgerald, supra note 25; Peter L.
Fitzgerald, Drug Kingpins and Blacklisting: Compliance Issues with U.S. Economic Sanctions, 4 & 5 J. MONEY
LAUNDERING CONTROL (forthcoming 2001).
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